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THE TRUTH ABOUT JUSTICE IREDELL'S

DISSENT IN CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA (1793)
JOHN V. ORTH*

ProfessorJohn Orth delivered this lecture at the University of North Carolina School of Law on April 14, 1994, as
part of the Faculty Perspectives Series. Professor Orth explains that Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia has
long been misrepresented: by the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the events surrounding the Eleventh Amendment's ratification;by Southerners who espoused states rights
in the nineteenth century; and by legal historians who verified
these accounts. Professor Orth exposes the "truth" in Justice
Iredell's dissent-that the opinion of the North Carolinajustice not only reveals his Federalistleanings, but also presages
Chief Justice John Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v.
Madison.
What is truth? said jesting Pilate,
and would not stay for an answer.
Francis Bacon1
Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one of the lesser but
revealing crimes of which it stood accused was the promulgation of an
official version of history, one that needed to be updated from time to
time to suit the vagaries of the "party line." Official history-a selective, laudatory, sometimes mendacious account of the origin and development (usually described as the "rise") of a particular state or
institution-was not, however, an exclusive product of the failed socialist state. Other states produced similar, if not quite so ruthlessly
enforced, versions of their own official history, and stateless races and
ethnic groups did (and do) the same, to the extent permitted by their
more limited resources. In the United States the early federal government by and large lacked the means and, mercifully, the will to dictate
its view of the national past; yet the Supreme Court, when it relies in
its decisions on one version or another of constitutional history, did
(and still does) generate a sort of official legal history.
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. FRANCIS BACON, Of Truth, in THE ESSAYS 61 (John Pitcher ed., Penguin Books
1985) (3d ed. 1625).
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Two hundred years ago in its February Term 1793-on February
18, 1793, to be exact-the Supreme Court announced the decision in
its first great case, Chisholm v. Georgia,2 an action by a South Carolina executor of the estate of a South Carolina merchant owed money
by the State of Georgia. With an authorized strength of six members
but with one vacancy, the Court ruled by a vote of four to one that it
had jurisdiction of the case and that judgment by default would be
entered against Georgia unless the state could produce a timely legal
defense to the claim.4 Following the immemorial practice of the English judges at Westminster Hall, the American justices then sitting in
Philadelphia delivered their opinions seriatim (one at a time), in reverse order of seniority. Speaking first, the newcomer Justice James
Iredell of North Carolina delivered a lengthy and scholarly dissenting
opinion, a dissent that for reasons both proximate and remote would
eventually become part of America's official constitutional history.
The immediate result of the majority decision in Chisholm was a
proposed constitutional amendment,' which would become the first to
be adopted after the ten amendments comprising the Bill of Rights.
Because of delays to give Georgia an opportunity to respond, final
judgment in the case was not entered until February 14, 1794.6 Within
weeks, both houses of Congress had proposed the Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."7 By February 7, 1795, less
than a year after its proposal and not quite two years after the
Supreme Court's momentous decision in Chisholm, the requisite
number of state legislatures had acted favorably.8
After some skillful casuistry by Chief Justice John Marshall, little
was heard in the Supreme Court about the Eleventh Amendment and
2. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
3. See Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J. AM.
HisT.19, 20-23 (1967).
4. Id. at 24-25.
5. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THm ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
64-65 (1972).
6. See JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 734 & n.36 (1971).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
8. See JACOBS, supra note 5, at 67. Presidential proclamation of ratification was
delayed almost three years, until January 8, 1798, the date traditionally given for the
Amendment. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 260 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897).
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nothing about Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm.9 Then in the
1880s, in a curious repetition of post-Revolutionary history, the
Supreme Court was presented with a series of claims against states
that had defaulted on their debts. 10 The state bond cases, all involving
Southern states and all stemming directly or indirectly from defeat in
the Civil War, confronted the Court anew with the challenge of exercising jurisdiction over a recalcitrant state. Like the biblical householder who knows how to bring forth from his storeroom things new
and old," the Supreme Court retrieved the Eleventh Amendment. 12
Hans v. Louisiana,'3 argued and submitted on January 22, 1890,
and decided on March 3, 1890, was a suit brought by a citizen owed
money by his own state; as such, it did not directly implicate the Eleventh Amendment, which applies only to suits by "Citizens of another
State" (or by "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State").' 4 What was
required for decision in Hans was a construction of the unamended
part of Article III of the Federal Constitution, describing the scope of
judicial power. The relevance of the Eleventh Amendment and of
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm was in the light they shed, if any, on the
meaning of that text. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, on behalf of a unanimous Court in Hans, dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.' 5
The history of the Eleventh Amendment, according to Justice
Bradley, proved that Article III had never been intended to extend
jurisdiction to such cases. Chisholm, he explained,
created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that,
at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously
proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures
of the States. This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all legis9. See JoHN V. ORTH, Trm JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEV-

34-42 (1987).
See id. at 78-79.
Matthew 13:52.
See ORTH, supra note 9, at 66-67, 75.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
15. Hans, 134 U.S. at 21. Justice John Marshall Harlan concurred only in the holding,
"that a suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial
power of the United States extends, unless the State itself consents to be sued." Id.
(Harlan, J., concurring). He expressly disapproved Justice Bradley's "comments made
upon the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia," which Harlan described as "not necessary to
the determination of the present case," adding: "Besides, I am of opinion that the decision
in that case was based upon a sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument
then was." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
ENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

10.
11.
12.
13.
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latures and all courts, actually reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court.' 6
The Eleventh Amendment, in other words, restored-it did not alter-the original understanding of the Constitution. Prompted by
Chisholm, the Amendment applied literally only to suits against states
by citizens of another state (and to similar suits by foreigners); noneextended to
theless, Justice Bradley reasoned, the same understanding
7
suits by citizens of the defendant state as well.'
Here the opinion of Iredell, the sole dissenter in Chisholm, was
vouched in evidence to support Justice Bradley's version of history:
This view of the force and meaning of the amendment is important. It shows that, on this question of the suability of the
States by individuals, the highest authority of this country
was in accord rather with the minority than with the majority
of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and this fact lends additional interest to the able opinion
of Mr. Justice Iredell on that occasion. The other justices
were more swayed by a close observance of the letter of the
Constitution, without regard to former experience and usage;
and because the letter said that the judicial power shall extend to controversies "between a State and citizens of another State;" and "between a State and foreign states,
citizens or subjects," they felt constrained to see in this language a power to enable the individual citizens of one State,
or of a foreign state, to sue another State of the Union in the
federal courts. Justice Iredell, on the contrary, contended
that it was not the intention to create new and unheard of

remedies, by subjecting sovereign States to actions at the suit
of individuals, (which he conclusively showed was never
done before,) but only, by proper legislation, to invest the
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine controversies and cases, between the parties designated, that
were properly susceptible of litigation in courts.
Looking back from our present standpoint at the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, [Justice Bradley continued], we
do not greatly wonder at the effect which it had upon the
country. Any such power as that of authorizing the federal
judiciary to entertain suits by individuals against the States,
had been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by the
great defenders of the Constitution whilst it was on its trial
before the American people.' 8
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 14-15.
18. Id. at 12.

1994]

JUSTICE IREDELL'S DISSENT

Justice Bradley deployed at this point quotations from Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall against constitutional jurisdiction over suits
against states 19 before returning to Iredell's dissent:
The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary
to be formally asserted. It was fully shown by an exhaustive
examination of the old law by Mr. Justice Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia; and it has been conceded in
every case since, where the question has, in any way, been
presented, even in the cases which have gone farthest in sustaining suits against the officers or agents of States. z°
Finally, Justice Bradley turned to the relevant statute in Hans, the Judiciary Act of 1875,21 for what he called "an additional reason why the
jurisdiction claimed for the Circuit Court does not exist."'2 2 Admitting
that the language on this point was identical to the Judiciary Act of
1789 and that the majority in Chisholm had not found it sufficient to
deny jurisdiction, Justice Bradley primly concluded: "Justice Iredell
thought differently."'24 Then in a cadenced sentence that ended not
only his brief statutory review but also his entire exposition of the
official version of Chisholm, Justice Bradley announced: "In view of
the manner in which that decision was received by the country, the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and the
reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to prefer Justice Iredell's views in this regard."'
Thus was the official version of this chapter of American legal
history established. Justice Bradley's line on Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment is familiar to most law students today, whose knowledge of constitutional history (such as it is) is gleaned from cases
assigned in law school: Hans is a staple of the course on federal jurisdiction. 26 Legal scholars loyally followed the Justice in their "unofficial" histories; for instance, Charles Warren paraphrased Hans in his
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 16.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.
Id.
Id.

25. Id. at 18-19.

26. See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1162 (3d ed. 1988); DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 433-41 (4th ed. 1990); PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW or FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 878 (3d ed. 1994).
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classic three-volume study, The Supreme Court in United States History, which set the standard for later accounts:
The decision fell upon the country with a profound shock.
Both the Bar and the public in general appeared entirely unprepared for the doctrine upheld by the Court; and their surprise was warranted, when they recalled the fact that the
vesting of any such jurisdiction over sovereign States had
been expressly disclaimed and even resented by the great defenders of the Constitution, during the days of the contest
over its adoption. 27
South of the Mason-Dixon Line, Iredell's dissent found a particularly enthusiastic audience. As the sectional division over slavery wid-

ened and John C. Calhoun began the systematic exposition of states
rights theory, the conjunction of a Southern justice with impeccable
Revolutionary credentials and the Eleventh Amendment, a locus classicus in the Federal Constitution of state sovereignty, proved irresistible. In the first, indeed until recently the only biography of Justice
Iredell,28 published in 1858 by Griffith J. McRee (who had married
the Justice's granddaughter), the dissent in Chisholm was explicitly related to the burning topic of secession, and Justice Iredell was hailed
as a states rightist avant la lettre:
The opinion of Judge Iredell enunciates either directly or by
implication the leading principles of what has been since
known as the "State Rights Doctrine" ....

[T]he men of the

South, in measuring the Sovereignty of the States, do not
simply look to the Constitution, because, in the language of
Judge Iredell, "A State does not owe its origin to the Government of the United States: it was in existence before it,"
but regard the records of the past as establishing as a great
historicalfact that the Government is a confederacy of sovereign States, and not a Government of one, undivided people
29

27. 1

CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY

96

(1922). Recent research by the editors of THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, has revealed that the public reaction to the
decision in Chisholm was "less deeply rooted than scholars have believed." Maeva Marcus
& Natalie Wexler, Suits Against States: Diversity of Opinion in the 1790s, 1993 J. Sup. CT.

HisT. 73, 86.
28. Justice Iredell is the subject of a new biography. Willis P. Whichard, The Sixth
Justice: A Life of James Iredell (1994) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, University of

Virginia).
29. 2 GRIM J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 381-82
(1858) (quoting with unindicated omission from Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) at 448). The ideas that Chisholm concerned states rights and that Justice
Iredell's dissent concerned the Constitution may have come from

GEORGE

VAN
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After the Civil War and the agonies of Reconstruction, Iredell's
dissent was even more cherished in certain Southern circles. "In

Chisholm v. Georgia, standing alone, Iredell enunciated and, with a
wealth of learning and 'arsenal of argument,' maintained the position
that a State could not be 'haled into court' by a citizen of another
State,"30 wrote the learned United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Henry Groves Connor, in 1912 in the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. He concluded that the Eleventh Amendment "was essentially a reversal of the decision of the
court and writing into the Constitution the dissenting opinion of Jus' 31
tice Iredell.
White Southerners' interpretation of Reconstruction came to
dominate national historiography. In a revealing assignment for the
monumental Dictionaryof American Biography in the 1930s, a leadSANTVOORD, SKETCHES OF THE LIVES, TIMES AND JUDICIAL SERVICES OF THE CHIEF JusTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 53-55 (1854), which McRee

quoted:
This great case excited an unusual degree of attention, both on account of the
novelty of the questions raised, and the important political consequences that
were supposed to be involved in the decision. The doctrine of State Sovereignty
and State Rights was for the first time brought before the Court for discussion.
These views [of the other justices] were not concurred in by Judge Iredell,
who delivered a dissenting opinion. That able jurist considered the question also
in a Constitutional point of view, and as a question of strict construction.
McREE, supra, at 51-54.
The modern editor of the Iredell papers has described McRee's work as a "political
weapon" against the North, explaining that McRee "discovered in several of Justice Iredell's writings, most notably in his dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court case of
Chisholm v. Georgia, the 'first authoritative expounder of the doztrine of States' rights

(Sovereignty of the States) ....... 1 THE PAPERS

OF JAMES IREDELL xxix

(Don Higginbot-

ham ed., 1976) (quoting letters from McRee to David L. Swain).
The states rights label was repeated in 1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY 174-75 (1892) ("From these views Iredell, alone,
dissented, in an opinion of which it has been truly declared that it enunciates either directly
or by implication all the leading principles of what has since become known as State Rights
Doctrine. .. ").
30. H.G. Connor, James Iredell: Lawyer, Statesman, Judge, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 225,240
(1912) (footnote omitted). In an ingenuous remark, Connor admitted that "[iut is a singular fact that, although Hamilton, in the Federalist, and Marshall and Madison in the Virginia Convention had expressed the opinion maintained by Iredell, neither he nor either of
the other justices referred to such opinions." Id. at 244. The singularity vanishes with the
recognition that the remarks of Hamilton, Marshall, and Madison, made during the ratification process, concerned the Constitution, while Justice Iredell strictly limited himself to
the later-passed Judiciary Act. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
31. Connor, supra note 30, at 244; see Junius Davis, Address at the Presentation of the

Portraits of Alfred Moore and James Iredell to the Supreme Court of North Carolina on
Behalf of the North Carolina Society of the Sons of the Revolution (Apr. 29, 1899) in 124
N.C. 559, 565 (1899).

262
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ing historian of Reconstruction, J.G. deR. Hamilton, was asked to
write the article on Justice Iredell. Conflating McRee and Connor,
Hamilton presented the Justice as first and foremost a states rightist:
His most famous opinion was that in Chisholm vs. Georgia
... where, in holding that a state could not be "haled" into
court by a citizen of another state, he enunciated, either directly or by implication, all the leading principles of the
state-rights doctrine. It is also a splendid legal argument,
closely reasoned, and confined to the question before the
court, whether an action of assumpsit could lie against a state
....
Recalling that such an action could not lie against the
Crown of England, he argued that it could lie against a state
only by authority of the Constitution and declared that in his

judgment it could not be found there ....

The opinion gives

an excellent idea of Iredell's political views as a state-rights
Federalist. His dissent not only met with the people's approval, as evidenced by the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, but received the almost unanimous indorsement of the
Supreme Court in the case of Hans vs. Louisiana nearly a
century later .... 32
The truth about Iredell's dissent is otherwise and more interesting. In
an opinion spread over twenty-one pages of small print in Alexander
Dallas's report, the constitutional question was addressed only in the
concluding paragraph. Everything that Iredell said on the subject in
Chisholm is in the following hesitant passage:
So far as this great question affects the Constitution itself, if
the present afforded, consistently with the particular grounds
of my opinion, a proper occasion for a decision upon it, I
would not shrink from its discussion. But it is of extreme
moment that no Judge should rashly commit himself upon
important questions, which it is unnecessary for him to decide. My opinion being, that even if the Constitution would
admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is necessary
for the purpose, since no part of the existing law applies, this
alone is sufficient to justify my determination in the present
case. So much, however, has been said on the Constitution,
that it may not be improper to intimate that my present opin32. J.G. deR. Hamilton, Iredell, James, in 5 DICIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOORAPHY
Part 1 at 492, 493 (Dumas Malone ed., 2d ed. 1961). Even as Hamilton wrote, the "official"
version of Chisholm was undergoing revision. In his 1927 lectures at Columbia University,

Charles Evans Hughes, citing the Supreme Court's opinion in South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904), observed: "Justice Bradley in delivering the opinion in
[Hans v. Louisiana] took the view that the decision in Chisholm v. Georgiawas wrong, but
this was afterwards said to be an expression obiter and not binding upon the Court."
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 120 (1928).
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ion is strongly against any construction of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a
State for the recovery of money. I think every word in the
Constitution may have its full effect without involving this
consequence, and that nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of which I consider, can
be found in this case) would authorize the deduction of so
high a power. This opinion I hold, however, with all the rein
serve proper for one, which, according to my sentiments 33
this case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judicial.
34
In an opinion said to have required an hour and a quarter to deliver,
the comments on the constitutional question (two sentences) must
have taken barely a minute.
The truth is that Justice Iredell's dissent rested solely, as he himself was repeatedly at pains to point out, on his interpretation of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.11 With a care that could be mistaken

for pedantry, Justice Iredell framed the question: "Will an action of

assumpsit lie against a State?"' 3 6 -by which he meant literally to confine the case to the narrow question of whether a state could be sued
in that particularform of action, not whether a state could be sued
generally. For the Court to hold that a state could be sued in assumpsit, Iredell methodically reasoned that "it must be in virtue of the Constitution of the United States, and of some law of Congress
conformable thereto."'3 7 The Constitution indeed said that the "judicial Power shall extend.., to Controversies... between a State and
Citizens of another State, ' ' 38 and the Judiciary Act provided that "the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of
a civil nature, where a state is a party ....
When the constitutional and statutory texts were so similar, it
may be asked why Justice Iredell remained insistent that his opinion
rested only on the latter, rather than on the former (or both). The
answer is that he had grasped rather earlier than most of his countrymen (even those of the Federalist persuasion) that constitutions and
statutes are essentially different-and that the difference inevitably
entails the doctrine of judicial review. A few years earlier, reflecting
33. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449-50.
34. Fred L. Israel, James Iredell, in 1 Tim JusrrcEs OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LrvEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 121, 130 (Leon Friedman & Fred

L. Israel eds., 1969).
35. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
36. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

on North Carolina's Constitution, Iredell had announced in an address to the public: "I have.., no doubt, but that the power of the
[General] Assembly is limited and defined by the constitution. It is a
creature of the constitution. ' '4° In practice this meant that the General
Assembly could not by a simple statute deny a right reserved in the
Constitution, as Iredell on behalf of an aggrieved client convinced a
reluctant state court in the celebrated case of Bayard v. Singleton.41 In
a private letter to one of North Carolina's delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Iredeli was even clearer:
[I] confess it has ever been my opinion, that an act inconsistent with the Constitution was void; and that the judges, consistently with their duties, could not carry it into effect. The
Constitution appears to me to be a fundamental law, limiting
the powers of the Legislature, and with which every exercise
of those powers must, necessarily, be compared.42
In Chisholm Justice Iredell had his first opportunity to write this opinion, if not into law, at least into unequivocal dictum. The federal legislature could, in the Judiciary Act, direct the manner of the Supreme
Court's proceedings with
but one limit; that is, "that they shall not exceed their authority." If they do, I have no hesitation to say, that any act to
that effect would be utterly void, because it would be inconsistent with the Constitution, which is a fundamental law paramount to all others, which we are not only bound to consult,
but sworn to observe; and, therefore, where there is an interference, being superior in obligation to the other, we must
43
unquestionably obey that in preference.
Having reviewed the relevant texts, constitutional and statutory,
and enunciated the doctrine of judicial review by way of establishing
the priority of the former over the latter, Iredell then turned to the
central concern of his long dissent, the manner of proceeding in assumpsit against a state. "If therefore, this Court is to be (is I consider
it) the organ of the Constitution and the law, not of the Constitution
only, in respect to the manner of its proceeding, we must receive our
40. James Iredell, To the Public, in 2 McREE, supra note 29, at 146 (address dated
Aug. 17, 1786). Iredell added parenthetically: "I hope this is an expression not
prosecutable." Id.
41. 1 Mart. 48,1 N.C. 42 (1787). Bayard was one of the first reported cases supporting
judicial review. 1 ALFRED H. KELLY, E AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT 86 (7th ed. 1991).
42. Letter from Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26,1787), in 2 McREE, supra note 29,
at 172.
43. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433.
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directions from the Legislature in this particular ..... ,44 That brought
him to the All Writs section of the Judiciary Act:
[A]II the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and
all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.45
The "principles and usages of law" must, Justice :redell concluded,
refer to the common law, which led him to reformulate his question:
Could a state be sued in assumpsit at common law? Here Justice Iredell mentioned what must have seemed to him a commonplace of
middle-of-the-road Federalism but what in after years was to endear
him to the states rights school, the concept of divided sovereignty:
Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider
to be as completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered. The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all
the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the
United States have no claim to any authority but such as the
States have surrenderedto them: Of course the part not surrendered must remain as it did before.4 6

At last, Iredell was ready for the final restatement of his question:
Did an action of assumpsit lie at common law against the sovereign?
Although the answer was a foregone conclusion, Justice Iredell filled
page after page with a detailed (and tedious) summary of English law
on the question,4 7 much of it quoted from Lord Somers's judgment in
the Bankers' Case,' which to this day is regarded as "a classic on the
subject of the legal remedies available against the Crown."'49 At the
end Iredell was able to pronounce the unremarkable conclusion that
at common law the only remedy in such cases was by petition of
right.50 Then, after a further detour into the ancient law of corpora44. Id.
45. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
46. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435. On the later misuse of Justice Iredell's reference
to divided sovereignty, see Jeff B. Fordham,-Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia: Its
Political Significance,8 N.C. HisT. REv. 155, 165-67 (1931); Kemp Plummer Yarborough,
Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study of the Minority Opinion 228-341 (1963) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University).
47. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 437-45.
48. 14 Howell's State Trials 1 (1700).
49. DAVID M. WALKER, THE OxFoRD COMPANION TO LAW 1156 (1980).
50. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 445.
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tions to negate the notion that states are in any sense corporations
deriving their legal existence from the national government, 51 he was
ready to sum up:
I have now, I think, established the following particulars. 1st.

That the Constitution, so far as it respects the judicial authority, can only be carried into effect by acts of the Legislature appointing Courts, and prescribing their methods of
proceeding. 2d. That Congress has provided no new law in
regard to this case, but expressly referred us to the old. 3d.
That there are no principles of the old law, to which we must
have recourse, that in any manner authorize the present suit,
either by precedent or by analogy. The consequence of
which, in my opinion, clearly is, that the suit in question cannot be maintained ....
What makes the truth about Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm
more interesting than the official version-let alone the states rights
falsification-is that it reveals a subtle legal mind at work, and a determinedly Federalist mind at that! Among history's many ironies is
the fact that Justice Iredell, himself so scrupulous about the distinction
between statutes and constitutions, should be known today chiefly
through commentaries by those who refused to see the difference. In
consequence, his reputation has suffered from the need to incorporate
a supposedly restrictive reading of the Constitution in Chisholm into a
life story otherwise plainly Federalist. To summarize the supposed inconsistency, the label "a states rights Federalist" (whatever that
means) was invented and has been frequently repeated.5 3 To rediscover the statutory basis of Iredell's dissent is to rediscover his consistency as a Federalist: one may dispense with the "states rights"
qualifier. 4 No one ever thought John Marshall any less a Federalist
because he led the Supreme Court to decline jurisdiction over a suit
for a writ of mandamus against James Madison. Reading Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm the way scholars have long read Marshall's

51. Id. at 446-49.
52. Id. at 449.
53. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 32, at 493; Robert M. Ireland, Iredell, James, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SURM COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 440, 441 (Kermit

L. Hall ed., 1992); Israel, supra note 34, at 131.
54. Don Higginbotham, the editor of the Iredell papers, see 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
IREDELL, supra note 29, observed that "there was a remarkable consistency to Iredell's
political thinking throughout his life." Don Higginbotham, Iredell,James, Sr. in 3 DIcroINARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIORAPHY 253, 254 (William S. Powell ed., 1988).
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opinion of the court in Marbury v. Madison55 shows that Iredell, like
Chief Justice Marshall, is better described as a canny Federalist.
Iredell had labored tirelessly in the Federalist cause in North Carolina. Although the proponents of the Constitution were hopelessly
outnumbered at the Hillsborough Convention in 1788, Iredell led
them in an exhaustive section-by-section analysis of the text, an application of Roger Sherman's sage advice, "When you are in a minority,
talk; when you are in a majority, vote."'5 6 Because the Anti-Federalists refused to cooperate, the Federalists had to "provide[ ] both point
and counterpoint ....

",

The inevitable defeat was not the end, as

Iredell (and another Federalist, William R. Davie) arranged to have
the debates published, and their wide circulation helped to turn the
tide.58 Iredell and other Federalists then skillfully engineered a second, successful convention at Fayetteville in 1789.1 9
Rewarded by President Washington with a Supreme Court appointment in 1790, Iredell rode the Southern Circuit and was acutely

aware of the continuing strength of anti-national feeling. Advance

warning of the specific problems posed by Chisholm came when he
presided over the federal circuit court in which an initial phase of that
case was heard.6" Rejected by Justice Iredell and his coadjutor on circuit, Chisholm's claim was commenced anew as a case within the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the case in which Justice Iredell
filed his now famous dissent.
Alert to the risks the Court ran by deciding against Georgia (or
any other recalcitrant state), Justice Iredell struggled mightily to point
his colleagues in a safer direction. If the Judiciary Act could be read
as not authorizing suits against states for the recovery of money, even
for the picayune reason that it failed to provide for the manner of
proceeding in actions of assumpsit, then the Court could honorably
55. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see ORTH, supra note 9, at 31-34; John J. Gibbons,
The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introductionto the Meaningof Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 435, 437-53 (1974); William Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.. 1.
56. Quoted in CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE
STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 93 (1966).
57. Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Law and the Experience of Politics in Late Eighteenth-Century
North Carolina:North CarolinaConsiders the Constitution,22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 577,
593-94 (1987).
58. BLACKWELL P. ROBINSON, WILLIAM R. DAvIE 208-10 (1957).
59. Id. at 210-18.
60. See Mathis, supra note 3, at 23. For Justice Iredell's handwritten opinion in the
case, Farquhar's Executor v. Georgia (C.C.D. Ga. 1791) (opinion on file in the James Iredell Sr. and Jr. Papers, Duke University), see 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., forthcoming 1994).
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retreat from the field by finding no jurisdiction. The early Federalist
historian, Richard Hildreth, came closer to the mark than McRee and
others, their eyes blinded by the glare of states rights: "Judge Iredell,
who seemed to lean against the jurisdiction, wished to escape a decision on an objection to the form of the action."61 Hildreth's insight,
unsuited to the needs of the time, was not, however, destined for inclusion in the official version of the case.
Had Iredell been able to pick up two votes from among his colleagues in Chisholm, the Court would have avoided the explosive issue of suits against states for the recovery of money, and the
Constitution would have been spared amendment. The plaintiff in
Chisholm would have been no worse off, since (as it turned out) he
lost his legal remedy anyway.62 Yet Justice Iredell's ingenious solution
would have saved federal jurisdiction over such suits as a sort of
"sleeping thunder," ready to be awakened at the command of Congress. Even with such encouragement, the Court would be dangerously exposed; politicians have an alarming way of abandoning their
61. Hildreth's full account of Chisholm v. Georgia is as follows:
Shortly before the termination of the [Feb. 1793] session, the Supreme Court of
the United States decided the first great constitutional question brought before it.
One Chisholm, being a citizen of another state, had brought an action against the
State of Georgia to recover a sum of money alleged to be due to him from the
state. Though the Governor of Georgia had been duly served with a copy of the
writ, no appearances had been entered to the action, whereupon the counsel for
the plaintiff moved for a judgment by default. This raised the question whether
the states were liable to be sued by individual citizens of other states. The affirm-

ative was maintained by Randolph, the attorney general, who appeared for the

plaintiff. Instead of making an argument in reply, the counsel retained for the
State of Georgia put in a written protest denying the jurisdiction of the court.
The case seemed to be plain enough, since, by the terms of the Constitution, the
jurisdiction was given in so many express words. The idea, however, of being
sued by individuals had excited a great fluttering in many of the states, none of
which had been remarkably prompt in paying their debts. The objection had
been started that, as the states were sovereign, they could not be sued. Judge
Iredell, who seemed to lean against the jurisdiction, wished to escape a decision
on an objection to the form of the action. The other judges held that the form of
the action was well enough; and that, as the United States constituted one nation,
the alleged sovereignty of the separate states must be considered to be so far
modified thereby as to subject them, under the terms of the Constitution, to suits
in the national courts.
4 RicHARD HILDRETH, THE HISToRY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 407-08 (rev.
ed. 1856).
62. The subsequent history of the Chisholm claim, voluntarily satisfied by Georgia in
1847, is detailed in Mathis, supra note 3, at 27-29. See also Christine Desan, Legal Immunity and Legislative Obligation: Institutional Understandings of Remedy in the Early Republic, Address Before the American Society for Legal History (1993) (arguing that
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment should be understood in terms of a late eighteenth century "legislatively centered" notion of popular sovereignty).

1994]

JUSTICE IREDELL"S DISSENT

269

allies in time of greatest need. So Iredell astutely added at the end of
his long disquisition on the Judiciary Act the brief qualification that
even with appropriate legislative authorization the Court would still
have the last word: if it took jurisdiction, it would leave to the politicians to provide for the enforcement of any judgments; if it refused
jurisdiction on constitutional grounds, it would make its consolation
prize a clear exercise of judicial review.63 In an uncanny premonition
of Chief Justice John Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison64 a
decade later, Justice Iredell observed that Congress could not confer
upon the Court a jurisdiction that exceeded constitutional bounds.
After Chisholm, Justice Iredell's career as a Federalist continued
unabated. On the Supreme Court his opinions in Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators65 and Hylton v. United States66 were strongly nationalist, and in Calder v. Bull67 he reiterated his belief in judicial
review and warned again against the risks of too aggressive a judicial
approach.6 8 On circuit he followed the orthodox Federalist line, supporting the Neutrality Proclamation (1793)69 and suppression of the
Whiskey Rebellion (1794).7 0 In Spring Term 1799, in what was to be
his last public judicial act, a charge to the grand jury in Philadelphia,
71
he upheld the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts.
It is a matter of history that Justice Iredell's cautions did not restrain his headstrong Federalist colleagues in Chisholm and that he
failed to save the Court from itself. Consequently, the Constitution
suffered the addition of the Eleventh Amendment, and future generations of justices have labored to develop a consistent jurisprudence
63. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449-50.
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 89-108 (1795) (Iredell, J., concurring).
66. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181-83 (1796) (Iredell, J., concurring).
67. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-400 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 400 (Iredell, J., concurring).
69. JAMES IREDELL, CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE CIRcUTrr COURT FOR THE
DisTmIcr OF SOUTH CAROLINA (May 12,1794), in GAZET=E OF THE UNITED STATES, June
12, 13 & 14, 1794, reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 454,457-58 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; JAMES IREDELL, CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE

CIRcuIT COURT FOR THE DisTRc OF PENNSYLVANIA (Apr. 12, 1796), in CLAYPOOLE'S
AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, Apr. 18, 1796, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra, at 106, 111-12.
70. IREDELL (Apr. 12, 1796), reprintedin 3 DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 69, at

106, 108-09.
71. IREDELL (Apr. 11, 1799), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at

332-51.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

concerning suits against states, with only limited success.7 2 In the end,
Iredell was the prophet of the Eleventh Amendment, not (as Justice
Bradley would have it in the official version) because Justice Iredell
confidently predicted the restoration of the original understanding,
but because Iredell foresaw in sorrow the consequences of impractical
judicial Federalism. 73
Justice Iredell's Federalism, nuanced to take account of contemporary realities, was in fact to triumph over Anti-Federalism (and proleptically over states rights), but he did not live to see it. His career
cut short by untimely death on October 20, 1799, barely forty-eight
years old, Iredell was denied the opportunity to guide his beloved
cause to its ultimate victory. Deprived of his acute intelligence, Federalism might indeed have gone to grief had it not promptly found a new
and far-sighted leader in John Marshall. Also tempered in the fire
surrounding Southern Federalism, Marshall was, as Chief Justice, better positioned than Justice Iredell, sustained by more realistic colleagues, and also longer lived. It was he, rather than Justice Iredell,
who found the correct responses to the challenges that were to
come. 74 The rest, as they say, is history.

72. For a description of "the theoretical incoherence of eleventh amendment jurisprudence," see HOWARD P. FINK & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY
AND PRACnCE

137-40 (1984).

73. In an ambiguous sentence in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), Justice Bradley
admitted the statutory basis of Justice Iredell's dissent:
Justice Iredell, on the contrary, contended that it was not the intention to create
new and unheard of remedies, by subjecting sovereign States to actions at the suit
of individuals, (which he conclusively showed was never done before,) but only,
by proper legislation, to invest the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear and
determine controversies and cases, between the parties designated, that were

properly susceptible of litigation in courts.

Id. at 12 (1890) (emphasis added).
74. I cannot agree with the suggestion by Ireland, supra note 53, at 441, that had Justice Iredell "lived a longer life and continued to serve on the Court during the period of
John Marshall, his brilliant legal mind, states rights federalism, and penchant for dissent

might have undermined the chief justice's campaign for judicial unanimity and constitutional nationalism." Quite the contrary!

